Session IV: Historical Examples of Successful Nonviolent Resistance to Coups

SESSION IV

HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF SUCCESSFUL NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE TO COUPS

PURPOSE OF THIOS SESSION: (1) to examine in detail two historical examples of how nonviolent struggle was used to defeat coups; (2) To underline the point that nonviolence provides effective methods for thwarting coups; (3) To give concrete illustrations of nonviolent methods that workshop participants could use to frustrate coups.

MATERIALS NEEDED: (1) Flip-chart stand; (2) Pad of newsprint; (3) Magic markers

ESTIMATED TIME: 40 minutes unless “Other Historical Examples” Section is added at the end

INTRODUCTION (Trainer’s talk – 5 minutes)

  1. Helpful to learn from history. Gives confidence that, if others have triumphed over attempted coups, we can too.
  2. Have often mentioned the Russian resistance to the attempted coup of August 1991 because it was recent and so well-documented.
  3. Useful to look at a couple if other examples where nonviolent methods defeated coups. What more can we learn?
  4. Will look at 2 historical examples, the 1961 attempted coup against French President Charles de Gaulle, and the 1920 attempted coup against the Weimer Republic in Germany.
    1. Both illustrate that legitimate government can be saved by the action of ordinary people acting nonviolently.
    2. Both were spontaneous responses to an attempted coup.

i. No planning or training prior to the coup.

ii. You, therefore, have the great advantage of being able to prepare yourselves ahead of time.

THE KAPP PUTSCH, GERMANY, 1920 (Trainer’s talk – 10 minutes)

  1. Political situation in Germany
    1. 1919- National assembly establishes a democratic government known as “The Weimer Republic.”
    2. Government faces severe economic and political problems due in part to Germany’s defeat in World War 1. Severe unemployment, government having to pay high reparations.
  2. Coup attempt in 1920
    1. Organized by Dr. Wolfgang Kapp, an extreme Right-wing nationalist, and Lt. Gen Walter von Luttwitz.
    2. Coup backed by Gen. Erich Ludendorff, who in World War I, had been chief of staff of Field Marshall Paul von Hindenburg. (Von Hindenberg was regarded as Germany’s greatest war hero because of his victories on the Eastern front.)
    3. Most of the German Army remained neutral, neither backing nor opposing the coup. • 5,000 ex-soldiers and civilians, organized into “Freikorps” units, occupied Berlin on March 12.
    4. Legal government under President Friedrich Ebert fled Berlin, eventually setting up in Stuttgart.
    5. Kapp declared himself Chancellor of the Reich and made von Luttwitz commander of the armed forces.
  3. Resistance to the coup
    1. The deposed Ebert government

i. Declared it was still the legal government and that all citizens have a duty to obey it.

ii. Directed the states to refuse all cooperation with the coup.

iii. Social Democratic Party issued proclamation, under the names of President Ebert and other party leader called for a general strike. Appeal read in part:

“The strongest resistance is required. No enterprise must work as long as the military dictatorship of the Ludendorfs reigns. Stop working! Strike! Strangle the reactionary clique…The whole economy must be paralyzed. No hands must move. No proletarian must help the military dictatorship. The total general strike must be carried through.”

    1. Sparked widespread nonviolent resistance to the coup.

i. Workers in Berlin spread strikes against the coup.

ii. Insurgents seized two Berlin newspapers supporting the Ebert government, but the printers struck.

iii. Leading civil servants refused to run the ministries under the insurgents and the government administration as a whole refused cooperation.

iv. Qualified people refused to accept posts in the new regime.

v. People in all sectors refused cooperation.

vi. Leaflets entitled, “The Collapse of the Military Dictatorship,” showered on Berlin by airplane.

  1. The plotters’ response:
    1. Repression – Some strikers shot to death.
    2. However, found to their dismay that they could issue orders and decrees, but these were not being acted upon.
    3. Story told that Kapp at one point found himself wandering up and down the corridors of power, looking in vain for a secretary to type up his proclamations.
  2. Developments
    1. March 15: Ebert government refuses to compromise with the usurpers.
    2. March 17: Berlin Security Police demand Kapp’s resignation. Kapp resigns and flees to Sweden. Many of his coconspirators flee Berlin in civilian clothing.
    3. “Friekorps” units resume obedience to the democratic government and march out of Berlin.
  3. Weimar government still had grave problems.
    1. In 1933, all traces of democratic government were removed with the appointment of Adolf Hitler as Chancellor.
    2. However, in 1920 the Weimar government showed that it could withstand the frontal attack of a coup through the nonviolent non-cooperation of its leaders and important sectors of the German people.

THE GENERALS’ COUP, FRANCE, 1961 (Trainer’s talk- 10 minutes)

  1. Political Situation
    1. France had invaded Algeria in 1830 and declared it a colony in 1848.
    2. War for independence broke out in 1954. Generals loyal to the legal government and capture de Gaulle ministers who were visiting Algeria.
    3. Seven years of bitter fighting -10,000 French soldiers 100,000 Algerians killed.
    4. Early in April, 1961 President Charles de Gaulle announced he was abandoning the attempt to keep Algeria French.
    5. This outraged large sections of the French officer corps, who were still rankling under defeats suffered in Indochina. They didn’t want to face another defeat in Algeria. They saw De Gaulle’s policy as an intolerable sellout and determined to replace him.
  2. Coup attempt
    1. April 21-22: French First Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment rebels and captures city of Algiers from legitimate French officials. Troops occupy government buildings.
    2. Rebels arrest three French Generals loyal to the legal government and capture De Gaulle ministers who were visiting Algeria.
    3. April 23: Four colonels who had organized the coup receive public backing by prominent French Generals, including head of air force. Most armed forces take a “wait-and-see” attitude.
    4. Rebels seize control of newspapers and radio in Algeria.
    5. Coup in Algeria at this point successful. Next step: move to replace the De Gaulle government in France.
  3. Problem for de Gaulle government
    1. A half-million French troops in Algeria – few operational units left in France and loyalty of some of them in doubt. Even forces loyal to De Gaulle were doing nothing to actively oppose the rebels.
    2. Powerful parachute units gave the rebels a tough, battle-hardened force for intervention. The bulk of the armed forces were either with them or neutral.
    3. Fear that a parallel coup would be attempted in Paris or that the Air Force would transport rebel troops to invade France and oust de Gaulle.
  4. Resistance to the coup
    1. April 23: French political parties and trade unions hold mass meetings, calling for one hour symbolic strike to demonstrate opposition to coup. De Gaulle broadcasts appeal to the nation:

“In the name of France, I order that all means – I repeat all means – be employed to bar the way everywhere to these men until they are brought down. I forbid every Frenchman, and in the first place every soldier, to carry out any of their orders.”

    1. Prime Minister Debre, fearing an airborne attack, closes the Paris airports, and appeals by radio to the people:

“The authors of the Algiers coup…have planes ready to drop or land parachutists on various [French] airfields as a preliminary to a seizure of power…As soon as the sirens sound, go [to the airports] by foot or by car, to convince the mistaken soldiers of their huge error.”

    1. Broadcasts were picked up in Algeria via transistor radio. Troops began to question their orders. Pilots pretended mechanical failures or flew their planes out of Algeria, making them unavailable for the invasion.
    2. April 24: 10 million French workers take part in a symbolic general strike, showing massive support for the legitimate government. People prepare to place vehicles on runways to block planes. Financial and shipping blockade on Algeria.
    3. Civil servants in Algeria hide documents or go into hiding in order not collaborate with the rebels.
    4. Police in Algeria declare support for De Gaulle government. Army units start to declare their support.
    5. Night of April 25-26, rebels withdraw from Algiers, a leading coup General surrenders and other go into hiding.
  2. Results
    1. Coup defeated with only three people killed and several wounded.
    2. Leaders of coup arrested or exiled. First Foreign Legion Parachute Legion disbanded.
    3. De Gaulle remained President, heading his legal government.
    4. Algeria became independent in 1962.

LESSONS FROM THE HISTORICAL CASES (Group discussion, trainer comments – 15 minutes)

  1. GROUP DISCUSSION
    1. Trainer asks group what lessons they draw from these cases.
    2. Trainer writes group’s comments on newsprint.
  2. If the group doesn’t bring up the following lessons, they should be mentioned by the trainer:
    1. Relation between civilians and military forces.

i. Non-cooperation by civilians can defeat well armed dedicated tough military forces.

ii. Military units often will take a “wait-and-see” attitude. Their decision to support the coup or not can be decisively influenced by the coup or not can be decisively influenced by how the civilian population reacts.

    1. Leaders of legitimate government have a key role:

i. Insist that people continue to recognize their legitimacy and authority

ii. Call for massive resistance- rally the people.

    1. However, nonviolent resistance can be done by ordinary civilians acting apart from government leaders.
    2. Civil servants and bureaucrats can undercut the rebels’ power by refusing to follow orders, delaying, etc.
    3. Role of strikes in the economic sector:

i. Usually do not DIRECTLY undercut the rebels’ power, since the rebels are initially seeking POLITICAL, rather than economic, objectives.

ii. However, strikes have great value symbolically to send a message of mass resistance. (The French strike, though symbolic and brief, involved 10 million people. Sent string message to the rebels.)

OTHER HISTORICAL EXAMPLES

Trainers might want to add other cases to illustrate the power of nonviolent resistance – “People Power” in the Philippines, Norway’s resistance to the Nazis, the Baltic States’ campaigns against the Soviets in the early 1990’s, etc. These need not necessarily be from an historical case of resistance to a coup. However, if a non-coup example is used, the trainer should make it clear that this is to show how a specific nonviolent strategy or tactic can effectively counter or defeat a specific method likely to be used in a coup.

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